| 企业间反需求状况定价行为:价格总水平的“内在稳定器” |
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| 引用本文： | 林洁. 企业间反需求状况定价行为:价格总水平的“内在稳定器”[J]. 商业研究, 2005, 0(24): 116-118 |
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| 作者姓名： | 林洁 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海对外贸易学院,金融管理学院,上海,200433 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用重复博弈的方法建立了一个企业间长期价格竞争模型,用于论证这样一个机制:随着市场需求的波动,企业为实现自身利益最大化所采取的非合作定价行为会与市场需求状况呈相反方向,从而对宏观价格总水平起到一种稳定器的作用。同时对该模型在我国的应用及模型本身可能存在的问题进行了探讨。
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| 关 键 词： | 非合作合谋 重复博弈 “物价稳定器” |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X(2005)24-0116-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-10-18 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-10-18 |
The Anti- Demand Pricing Conduct Between Firm's Contest An "Internal Steady Instrument" of Macroeconomic Price Level |
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| LIN Jie. The Anti- Demand Pricing Conduct Between Firm's Contest An "Internal Steady Instrument" of Macroeconomic Price Level[J]. Commercial Research, 2005, 0(24): 116-118 |
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| Authors: | LIN Jie |
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| Affiliation: | Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade, Shanghai 200433, China |
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| Abstract: | Using repeated game method,the paper builds a model of firms long-run price contest to demonstrate a mechanism:with the fluctuating of the market demand,firms would be inclined to make price altering reverse to the demand,which would react on the macroeconomic price level as a sort of "internal steady instrument".It also discusses the applications and possible problems of the model. |
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| Keywords: | non-cooperative collusion repeated game " internal steady instrument" |
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