| Abstract: | This article provides evidence on the determinants of royaltiesand upfront fees in share contracts by examining how state franchisetermination laws affect franchise contracts. The results areconsistent with the joint hypothesis that the two-sided moralhazard model explains the terms in franchise contracts and thattermination laws increase the relative importance of franchisoreffort (due to the extra effort that is required to controlsystem quality). I find that franchise companies that are headquarteredin termination-law states charge significantly higher royaltyrates than companies headquartered in other states (around 1%higher). Correspondingly, the initial franchise fees are lowerfor companies headquartered in termination states. Overall,franchisees appear to pay a higher price for franchises in stateswith protection laws. Consistent with a basic tenet of law andeconomics, price adjustments appear to offset at least someof the transfers that would otherwise be implied by the laws. |
