| 中小企业银行融资的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 岳朝龙,岳香.中小企业银行融资的博弈分析[J].安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版),2004,21(6):41-42. |
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| 作者姓名： | 岳朝龙 岳香 |
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| 作者单位： | 安徽工业大学,经济学院,安徽,马鞍山,243002 |
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| 基金项目： | 安徽省教育厅人文社会科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 对中小企业与银行间融资博弈关系分析表明:银企融资关系中,中小企业具有信息优势,且违约信用损 失较小,从而加大了银行信贷风险,造成了银行对中小企业的“惜贷”现象;银企只有建立长期的合作关系,才能达到 双赢。为此必须加大对中小企业的违约惩罚力度,建立中小企业贷款担保体系和信用体系。
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| 关 键 词： | 中小企业 融资 动态博弈 信息不对称 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-9247(2004)06-0041-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年10月1日 |
The Games Analysis on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises' Bank Financing |
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| Authors: | YUE Chao-long YUE Xiang |
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| Abstract: | The financing game relationship is analysed between the bank and these enterprises in this paper from the game theory.The results are as follows:firstly,in their financing relationship,these enterprises are in favorable information conition and their contract breaching loss is smaller so that it has icreased the bank’s credit risk and caused the phenomenon of “reluctance to credit”.Secondly,the bank and enterprises can pursue profit together only by long term cooperation.So we must increase the punishment on violating enterprises and establish credit guaratee system and credit system for the small and medium sized enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | small and medium sized enterprises financing dynamic game information asymmetry |
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