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多供给方情形下物流联盟伙伴的利益分配
引用本文:贺盛瑜,郭晓林. 多供给方情形下物流联盟伙伴的利益分配[J]. 中国流通经济, 2005, 19(5)
作者姓名:贺盛瑜  郭晓林
作者单位:1. 西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川,成都,610031
2. 成都信息工程学院,四川,成都,610041
基金项目:国家自然科学基金,四川省教育厅资助项目
摘    要:本文认为,物流联盟带来的利益可以有很多形式,但每一种利益都可归结为给物流需求方带来的成本节约,即经济利益。当物流需求方自行组织物流得到与物流外包同质的物流服务时,前者的成本与后者的成本之差即为其由物流联盟带来的总利益。在用合作博弈的思想讨论物流联盟伙伴的利益分配时,假设条件都非常强。这使得按照合作博弈思路进行利益分配的结果,对现实的指导意义大大减弱。假设只有两个具有完成物流需求方物流任务能力的物流供给方;利益分配通过暗标拍卖的方式来确定,建立暗标拍卖模型,通过分析,结果表明,物流联盟的总利益及物流需求方的利益均与供给方的成本及行业平均利润率有关。

关 键 词:物流联盟  利益分配  非合作博弈

The Benefits Allocation of Logistic Alliance under the Condition of Multi-Provider
HE Sheng-yu,GUO Xiao-lin. The Benefits Allocation of Logistic Alliance under the Condition of Multi-Provider[J]. China Business and Market, 2005, 19(5)
Authors:HE Sheng-yu  GUO Xiao-lin
Affiliation:HE Sheng-yu1 and GUO Xiao-lin2
Abstract:The author maintains that there are different kinds of benefits brought by logistic alliance. All these benefits can boil down to the cost-saving for logistics demanders,that is to say economic benefits.When the logistic demanders obtain the same logistics service from logistics out-sourcing as they obtain from their own logistics,the difference between these two costs is the total benefit brought by logistic alliance.When we applied the method of the cooperative game to discuss the benefits allocation of logistic alliance,given conditions were too ideal to accord with the fact.So,we must have a new discussion to the benefits allocation of logistic alliance.With the first-price sealed auction model,this paper analyzes in detail the benefits allocation of logistic alliance under the condition of multi-provider.The outcome reveals that the total benefits of logistic alliance and the benefits of every party are related to the cost of the provider and the average profit margin of its trade.
Keywords:logistic alliance  benefits allocation  uncooperative game
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