Stochastic stability in assignment problems |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Mathematics and Physics, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212003, China;2. College of Computer Science and Engineering, Changshu Institute of Technology, Changshu 215500, China;3. State Key Laboratory of Mechanics and Control of Mechanical Structures, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China |
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| Abstract: | In a dynamic model of assignment problems, it is shown that small deviations suffice to move between stable outcomes. This result is used to obtain no-selection and almost-no-selection results under the stochastic stability concept for uniform and payoff-dependent errors. There is no-selection of partner or payoff under uniform errors, nor for agents with multiple optimal partners under payoff-dependent errors. There can be selection of payoff for agents with a unique optimal partner under payoff-dependent errors. However, when every agent has a unique optimal partner, almost-no-selection is obtained. |
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| Keywords: | Assignment problem (Core) stability Decentralization Stochastic stability |
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