| 天保工程建设：中央与地方政府投资博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘德权,杨磊.天保工程建设：中央与地方政府投资博弈[J].林业经济,2008(3). |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘德权 杨磊 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北林业大学;黑龙江科技学院 哈尔滨150040 哈尔滨商业大学 哈尔滨; |
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| 基金项目： | 黑龙江省博士后经费资助项目(编号：LRB05—017) |
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| 摘 要： | 通过构建我国中央与地方林业投资的博弈模型,深入分析了两类利益主体所处的数种纳什均衡,借以探讨了在天然林保护工程实施中地方林业配套资金难以落实的问题,并查找原因,提出建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 林业 投资 利益 博弈 |
Nature Forest Protection Project:Game of Central and Local Government |
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| Liu Dequan Yang Lei.Nature Forest Protection Project:Game of Central and Local Government[J].Forestry Economics,2008(3). |
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| Authors: | Liu Dequan Yang Lei |
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| Institution: | Liu Dequan~1 Yang Lei~2 (1 Northeast Forestry University,Harbin 150040,2 Harbin Unversity of Commerce,Harbin 150025,3 Heilongjiang University of Science & Technology,Harbin 150027) |
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| Abstract: | Setting up the game theory model of forestry investment between the central and the local,the paper deeply analyzes two kinds of interesters in some Nash-equilibrium.Using these theories,it discusses the problem of local quota financing which always is difficult to fulfill in the Nature Forest Protection Project,and find some reasons,put forward some advices. |
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| Keywords: | forestry investment interest game |
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