Kantian dignity and social economics

Many social economists endorse the ethics of Immanuel Kant, specifically his emphasis on the dignity of humanity and the equal respect due all persons. Based on these tenets, Kant mandates a social outlook in which concern for others, characterized by negative duties of respect and positive duties of beneficence, are broadly required of all rational agents. However, some of the positions that social economists derive from Kantian dignity actually violate it, such as support for a welfare state and opposition to the institution of wage employment. I will show that both of these positions are inconsistent with the traditional understanding of Kantian dignity, suggesting that social economists should either ground their positions on a different concept of dignity, or revise them to remain consistent with Kant's specific sense of dignity. For helpful comments and criticism I thank John Davis, Charles Wilber, David Ellerman, and the rest of the participants in the “Economic Philosophy and Theories of Justice” session at the 2003 meetings of the Association for Social Economics, as well as two anonymous referees. All remaining errors are my own.