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国有经营者激励契约的博弈分析
引用本文:岳公正,曾德荣. 国有经营者激励契约的博弈分析[J]. 商业研究, 2006, 0(12): 41-44
作者姓名:岳公正  曾德荣
作者单位:1. 清华大学,公共管理学院,北京,100084
2. 北京交通大学,经济管理学院,北京,100044
摘    要:企业是要素市场一系列契约的结点。对企业经营者的激励契约问题进行研究,具有重要的现实意义。利用“激励相容”机制,可以实现“个人理性”和“集体理性”的统一。从博弈理论的角度来看,“激励相容”达到的是一个“纳什均衡”状态,这是达到帕累托最优的必要条件。

关 键 词:国有企业  激励契约  博弈
文章编号:1001-148X(2006)12-0041-04
收稿时间:2005-08-01
修稿时间:2005-08-01

The Analysis of the Game on the Incentive Contract of State-owned Enterprise Managers
YUE Gong-zheng,ZENG De-rong. The Analysis of the Game on the Incentive Contract of State-owned Enterprise Managers[J]. Commercial Research, 2006, 0(12): 41-44
Authors:YUE Gong-zheng  ZENG De-rong
Affiliation:1. School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Bering 100084, China ; 2. School of Economics and Management, Northern Beijing University, Beijing 100044, China
Abstract:Enterprise is the convergence of a series of contracts of market factors.The study on the incentive contract with enterprise managers is of enormous theoretical and practical significance.The "incentive compatibility" mechanism can help to integrate "individual sense" and "collective sense".Seen from the perspective of game theory,"incentive compatibility" has reached the state of "Nash balance",the necessary condition to reach Pareto Optimality.
Keywords:state-owned enterprise  incentive contracts  game
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