Corporate Legal Responsibility: A Levinasian Perspective |
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Authors: | Conceição Soares |
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Institution: | (1) CEGE/Faculty of Economics and Management, Catholic University of Portugal –Porto, Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327, Porto, 4169-005, Portugal |
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Abstract: | In this article I will look into Corporate Legal Responsibility taking into account Levinas’s notion of infinite responsibility, as well as his understanding of ethical language. My account of Levinas’s philosophy will show that it challenges – breaking
down – deeply entrenched distinctions in the dominant strands of moral philosophy, within which the theory of individual responsibility
is embedded, such as between:(1) duty to others on the one hand and supererogation on the other; (2) perfect duty to others
on the one hand and imperfect duties to others on the other; (3) insiders and outsiders; kith and kin on the one hand and
strangers on the other; Levinas’s moral vision is an inclusive one which embraces all of humanity (at least of those present
today) irrespective of historical, linguistic, cultural differences and diversities. In other words, each has responsibilities
for and duties towards all others. Of course, one might say that there is nothing new about a universalising ethics – after
all Kantianism, liberalism as well as utilitarianism are well known instances. However, more crucially, all these traditional
moral philosophies uphold the theory of individual responsibility, which is rooted in the philosophy of individualism. Such
a philosophy can make sense only of the concept of individual moral/legal agency but not corporate agency. Therefore, in this
article I will attempt to show that the Levinasian vision is able to help us change our view with respect to corporate responsibility. |
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Keywords: | corporate responsibility justice saying Levinas sociality face |
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