投资者是否被上市公司的盈余管理行为所误导?——来自配股融资的证据

为了获得配股资格和提高配股价格，上市公司具有通过调整异常应计利润来提升报告盈余的强烈动机。本文使用横截面修正的Jones模型研究了配股公司盈余管理的时间序列分布特征．并分析了异常应计利润与配股后运营业绩和股票长期收益的关系。研究结果表明，配股公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年都具有较高的异常应计利润，而配股后运营业绩和股票长期收益趋于下降，异常应计利润与配股后的股票长期收益具有显著的负相关关系。投资者由于没有能够及时“看穿”配股公司的盈余管理行为而暂时高估了股票价值，从而被上市公司的盈余管理行为所误导。

Are Investors Misled by Earnings Management of Listed Firms in China?——Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings

Listed Companies in China have strong incentive to manage earnings upward by altering discretionary accounting accruals to gain the rights issues and raise stock prices. This paper examines the time-series distribution of earnings management around the offerings based on the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model, and studies the association between discretionary accruals and post offering earnings and long-run stock return. We find evidence that SEO firms, on average, have high positive earnings and discretionary accruals in the year preceding and the year of SEOs, followed by poor long-run earnings and poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter in the post-offering period. These findings suggest that the stock market temporarily overvalues issuing firms and investors are misled by earnings management.