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经营性土地出让中的博弈分析——以南京市土地市场为例
引用本文:汪乐勤,孙佑海. 经营性土地出让中的博弈分析——以南京市土地市场为例[J]. 中国土地科学, 2007, 21(4): 11-17
作者姓名:汪乐勤  孙佑海
作者单位:1. 南京农业大学土地管理学院,江苏,南京,21005;南京市土地矿产市场管理办公室,江苏,南京,210008
2. 全国人大环境资源委员会,北京,100002
摘    要:研究目的:基于公共地的悲剧模型,构建经营性土地出让中各供给主体在个体理性支配下同整体理性进行博弈的模型框架,并以此对目前实践中存在的问题进行解析。研究方法:比较分析和实证分析。研究结果:多个供给主体在个体理性支配下的博弈行为会导致土地供给趋于饱和并且会进一步导致土地供应过量。研究结论:提出建立以促进集约利用土地为核心的行政管理体制,完善以土地储备为基础的政府垄断土地一级市场的政策措施的建议。

关 键 词:土地经济  经营性土地  出让  博弈
文章编号:1001-8158(2007)04-0011-07
修稿时间:2006-12-20

Game Analysis on Operational Land Transfer: A Case of Nanjing
WANG Le-qin,SUN You-hai. Game Analysis on Operational Land Transfer: A Case of Nanjing[J]. China Land Sciences, 2007, 21(4): 11-17
Authors:WANG Le-qin  SUN You-hai
Abstract:The purpose of the paper is to construct the model in which the operational land suppliers as individuals play game with the general sense in order to solve existing problems in practice.Methods of comparative analysis and case study were employed.The results show the behavior of the operational land suppliers as individuals would result in not only the land supply prone to the saturation but also excessive land supply.It is suggested to set up the administrative management system to promote intensive land use and to improve measures of the government monopoly on primary land market.
Keywords:operational land  transfer  game
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