债务监管机制对公司经营绩效的门槛效应分析

本文选择上海与深圳证券交易所的上市公司作为研究对象，探讨了公司监管机制与经营绩效的关联，样本期间涵盖了2001年至2006年的数据。采用Hansen（1999）所提出的门槛回归模型来进行实证分析，实证结果表明负债比率对公司经营绩效存在显著的门槛效果，即在公司规模的区分下，呈现出高低不对称的关系。此外，规模因子呈现了负向及非线性的影响关系，这意味着在公司扩大产能情况下，资产管理效率降低将对整体的获利能力造成负面影响，但此负面的效果呈现递减的现象。文章进一步以公司规模为指标将样本分为上下门槛两个区间，当公司规模落入下区间时，提高负债融资的水平将有助于提高债权人对管理当局的监管程度；若公司规模落入上区间时，此效果将不易发挥。在现金股利发放方面，公司发放的现金股利愈多时，在市场投资人预期心理及监管下，也有助于提高公司整体的营运绩效。最后，机构投资人与政府持股并没有呈现显著的关联。

The Threshold Effect Analysis of Debt Supervised Function on Firms' Performance

The study investigated the relationship between corporation supervisory quality and firm' s performance in the securities market of Shanghai and ShenZhen from 2000 to 2007 years. The empirical model adopts the panelthreshold regression model by Hansen (1999). Ourresults show thatthere is significantly asymmetric non -linearrelationship between debtratio and firm' s performance. Debtratio present a positive significantly effects on firm' s profitiffirm size low than the specific threshold value, but it do notreveal significantly effects in high area.In addition, when corporation provide a high cash dividend,the influence on firm's performance is positive by the expectation and supervision of marketinvestors. The firm' s size presents the correlation of negative and non -linear with the operated performan. Finally,the ownerships ofinstitutionalinvestors and government do not present significantly effects.