Bargaining with asymmetric information in non-stationary markets |
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Authors: | Daniel Trefler |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Toronto, M5S 3G7, CANADA (e-mail: trefler@chass.utoronto.ca), CA |
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Abstract: | Summary. The Rubinstein and Wolinsky bargaining-in-markets framework is modified by the introduction of asymmetric information and non-stationarity. Non-stationarity is introduced in the form of an arbitrary stochastic Markov process which captures the dynamics of market entry and pairwise matching. A new technique is used for establishing existence and characterizing the unique outcome of a non-stationary market equilibrium. The impact of market supply and demand on bilateral bargaining outcomes and matching probabilities is explored. The results are useful for examining such questions as why coordination failures and macroeconomic output fluctuations are correlated with real and monetary shocks. Received: July 22, 1994; revised version: January 21, 1998 |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Non-cooperative bargaining Matching Asymmetric information Non-stationarity Output fluctuations. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 C78 E20. |
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