| 大国政府间的汇率博弈——中美巨额贸易差额下的人民币汇率问题研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 赵春明,王怀民.大国政府间的汇率博弈——中美巨额贸易差额下的人民币汇率问题研究[J].国际贸易问题,2005(1):86-90. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 赵春明 王怀民 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 本文为作者承担的国家社会科学基金项目"我国进行对外直接投资的产业和区位选择问题研究"(项目号为03CJL010)和教育部人文社会科学研究"十五"规划项目"国内市场扭曲与我国对外开发"(项目号为01JC790009)及北京师范大学国际经济学创新群体项目阶段性成果. |
| |
| 摘 要： | 从中美两国博弈的角度来看,美国会迫使人民币升值来解决两国间长期存在的巨额贸易差额。在本文的研究中,美国效用期望值最大时的最优升值率介于0和茁之间,中国的最优选择是允许人民币升值,但最优升值率为茁/2。在人民币升值后,如果美国仍进行报复,中国的最优选择是进行反报复,并可通过合理选择报复对象以实现最优。
|
| 关 键 词： | 中美贸易差额 人民币汇率 博弈 最优升值率 |
The Game Between Governments of China and USA on Foreign Exchange Rates-Research on the Exchange Rate of RMB under the Large Sino-American Trade Gaps |
| |
| ZHAO Chun-ming WANG Huai-min.The Game Between Governments of China and USA on Foreign Exchange Rates-Research on the Exchange Rate of RMB under the Large Sino-American Trade Gaps[J].Journal of International Trade,2005(1):86-90. |
| |
| Authors: | ZHAO Chun-ming WANG Huai-min |
| |
| Institution: | ZHAO Chun-ming WANG Huai-min |
| |
| Abstract: | From the view of the game, American Government would resolve the issue of large trade deficit from China by forcing Chinese RMB appreciation. Fo r USA, in this paper, the rate of Chinese RMB appreciation will be between zero and ?茁. For China, the best choice is to face the fact of RMB appreciation, but the optimum rate of appreciation will be ?茁/2. After RMB appreciation, China c an adopt retaliatory measures if USA still nurse thoughts of revenge. |
| |
| Keywords: | Sino-America Trade Gaps Foreign Exchange Rates of RMB Game Optimum Rate of Appreciation |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
