A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemployment |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Leo?KaasEmail author Paul?Madden |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Hohenstaufengasse 9, 1010 Vienna, AUSTRIA;(2) School of Economic Studies, Manchester University, M13 9PL Manchester, UK |
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Abstract: | Summary. We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria involving unemployment and positive profits. A firm does not undercut the equilibrium wage since then high wage firms would attract its workers, thus forcing the undercutting firm out of both markets. Full employment equilibria are payoff dominated by unemployment equilibria, and the arguments are robust to decreasing returns.Received: 21 May 2001, Revised: 15 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
D43, E24.Correspondence to: Leo KaasWe thank an anonymous referee, Woojin Lee, Klaus Ritzberger and seminar participants in Konstanz, Manchester, Milan, Prague, Vienna, and Warwick for helpful comments. Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) under grant L138251030 and from the Manchester School Visiting Fellowship Scheme is gratefully acknowledged. |
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Keywords: | Involuntary unemployment Multi-stage game Imperfect competition |
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