国有企业公司化改制中的“内部人控制”问题与企业家成长

国有企业公司化改制中的“内部人控制”问题的实质是企业经理人员在激励和约束不对称的条件下,企业家的行为扭曲。他们将自己的创新能力从市场的开拓和产品的开发等创新活动中转移到寻找制度的漏洞,利用制度的不完全性和改革的不彻底性,侵占国有资产。因此,国企改制的目的,就是要矫正企业家行为,为企业家的成长设计出相应的激励和约束机制。其中财产抵押制、年薪制和股票期权制在整合国有资产与企业家利益中具有极为重要的作用。

The Problem of Insider Control in State-owned Enterprises' Corporation Reformation & Entrepreneurs′Growth

Under symmetric conditions of incentive and constraint, the essence of the problem of insider control in state-owned enterprises' corporation reformation is that entrepreneurs' action be twisted, their creativities from opening up market and developing products to searching system leak and making use of in complete system and reformation to embezzle government asset. Therefore, the aim of state-owned enterprises' corporations reformation is to correct entrepreneurs' behaviors and design an incentive and constraint mechanism for entrepreneur's growth, including property mortgage, annual-paid system and options which would paly an important role in integrating government assts with entrepreneurs' growth.