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税收流失的博弈分析
引用本文:马拴友. 税收流失的博弈分析[J]. 财经问题研究, 2001, 0(6): 3-8
作者姓名:马拴友
作者单位:中国社会科学院财贸所,财政室,北京,100836
摘    要:从财政交易制度框架内看,税收流失其实是一种交易成本。纳税人与税务当局的非合作博弈,不存在纯战略纳什均衡,但存在混合战略纳什均衡,即税务机关和纳税人分别以一定的概率随机选择稽查和逃税,同时,税收流失也表现为征税中存在的纳税与人政府、政府与纳税人以及政府、税务机关与税务人员三种委托代理问题。因此,依法治税的激励结构设计至少应包括四个方面:保证财政交易制度中的支出面与税收收入基本对称:优化税制;税务机关激励纳税人讲实话的制度安排,对税务人员的激励。

关 键 词:逃税  搭便车  非合作博弈  代理问题
文章编号:1000-176X(2001)06-0003-06
修稿时间:2001-03-27

Analysis of Tax Losing Game
MA Shuan-you. Analysis of Tax Losing Game[J]. Research On Financial and Economic Issues, 2001, 0(6): 3-8
Authors:MA Shuan-you
Abstract:The tax loss is in fact a transaction cost in the framework of financial trading.The tax collectors,at given probability,audit randomly the tax payers who respond to such auditing in the same way accordingly:It is typically a none cooperative game with no pure strategy of Nash equilibrium but a mixed one.There is a multiple principal agency relation in the tax loss process among the tax payer and government,the government and tax payer,and the government,the tax authority and the tax collectors.So,the incentive design of collecting taxes by law should consist of at least the following factors:the balance between the expenditure and tax revenue in the financial exchange,optimizing the tax system,a system to encourage the tax payers to tell the truth,and an incentive of tax collectors.
Keywords:tax evasion  free rider  none cooperative game  agency problem  
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