控股股东股权质押、政府补助与创新投入——基于战略性新兴产业的实证分析

以2009—2017年沪深两市制造业战略性新兴产业上市公司为研究对象，基于信号传递理论，研究上市公司控股股东股权质押对企业创新投入的影响，并探讨了政府补助的调节作用。结果表明：制造业战略性新兴产业企业控股股东股权质押对企业创新投入存在负面影响，但这种负面影响在国有企业与传统制造业企业中不显著；政府补助可以缓解控股股东股权质押与企业创新投入之间的负面影响，这种缓解作用在制造业战略性新兴产业企业中更为显著。进一步分组检验发现，在股权质押率高组中，政府补助反而加大了控股股东股权质押对企业创新投入的负面影响，表明股权质押率高的企业可能存在着控股股东自利行为。在股权质押行为普遍存在的条件下，研究结论对相关产业扶持政策制定有一定的借鉴意义。

Controlling Shareholder Pledge, Government Subsidies and Innovation Investment: An empirical analysis based on strategic emerging industries

Taking the listed companies in the strategic emerging industries of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2009 to 2017 as the research object, based on the signal transmission theory, the influence of the controlling company''s controlling shareholder pledge on the innovation investment of enterprises was studied, and the adjustment effect of government subsidies was discussed . The results show that the equity pledge of controlling shareholders of strategic emerging industries has a negative impact on corporate innovation investment, but it does not exist in state-owned enterprises and traditional manufacturing enterprises; government subsidies can alleviate the relationship between controlling shareholders'' equity pledge and corporate innovation investment. The negative impact of this mitigation is more pronounced in manufacturing strategic emerging industries. Further group test finds that in the group with high equity pledge rate, government subsidies have deepened the negative impact of controlling shareholders'' equity pledge on corporate innovation investment, indicating that such enterprises may have self-interested controlling shareholders. Under the conditions of the universal existence of equity pledge, the research conclusions have certain reference significance for the formulation of relevant industry support policies.