| 强势投资者的博弈与信息流转 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨继生.强势投资者的博弈与信息流转[J].价值工程,2006,25(9):148-151. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨继生 |
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| 作者单位： | 河南财经学院经济学系,郑州,450002 |
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| 摘 要： | 股票价格的运行是全体投资者相互博弈的结果,而投资者的策略选择是其所拥有信息的函数。本文主要讨论在多个强势投资者共存时,投资者的信息修正和策略选择。研究使强势投资者的信息修正和个股市场价格运行满足马尔可夫性质,并快速达到均衡状态的信息结构。研究显示,多强势投资者的共存是平抑个股价格波动、提高市场效率的关键,强势投资者数目越多,信息流转速度越快。
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| 关 键 词： | 股票价格 信息 均衡 策略 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-4311（2006）09-0148-04 |
Games Between Powerful Investors and the Transmitting of Information |
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| Yang Jisheng.Games Between Powerful Investors and the Transmitting of Information[J].Value Engineering,2006,25(9):148-151. |
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| Authors: | Yang Jisheng |
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| Institution: | Department of Economics, Henan Institute of Finance and Economics,Zhengzhou 450002, China |
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| Abstract: | The appearance of stock market results from the game between all investors, and the selection of investors is the function of their information set. In this paper, discussion is focused on the refinement of information hold by investors and their selection of trade strategy. The intention is to study the information structure by which the behavior of investors and the price process of securities come to Markov equilibrium in the shortest time. The conclusion is that coexist of powerful investors for single stock is the key to smooth the stock prices. |
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| Keywords: | prices of stock information equilibrium strategy |
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