中国经济中的私人产权保护和经济增长:资源配置视角

既然中国一直缺少保护私人产权的正式制度,为什么私营企业和外商敢于在中国大规模投资而不担心产权会遭受侵犯?本文建立了一个政府、官员、百姓和外商之间的动态博弈模型,在一个一般均衡框架内考察了国内资源分配格局与产权保护以及均衡产出之间的内生关系,并尝试性的解释了:(1)中国为什么要维持一个低效率而庞大的国有部门;(2)私有部门是如何陷入"融资困境"的;(3)中国的外资部门为什么这么庞大;(4)中国独特的经济结构是如何造就二十多年的高速经济增长的。

Protection of Private Property Rights and Economic Growth in China:From a Perspective of Resource Allocation

Given the very weak "conventional institutions"(such as the rule of law and separation of powers),why did the native private companies and the foreign companies invest so much in China without worrying about the security of their investments? This paper develops a dynamic game model to explore the relationship between the allocation of domestic capital and the protection of private property rights in China economy. Using this model,we explain:(1)Why has the Chinese government sustained such a huge state-owned sector; (2) How did the private sector plunge into "the dilemma of funding"; (3)Why has there been so much FDI in China; (4) How this special economic structure fosters the rapid economic growth in China.