Shareholder litigation,management forecasts,and productive decisions during the initial public offerings |
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Authors: | Yinghua Li |
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Affiliation: | Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 West State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056, United States |
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Abstract: | This paper develops a model to analyze the impact of shareholder litigation on managers’ voluntary disclosure strategies in equity offerings. The major findings are as follows. First, under different economic parameters, the entrepreneur has two possible equilibrium disclosure strategies: full and partial disclosure. Of particular interest is the latter equilibrium, in which shareholder litigation can give the entrepreneur incentives to partially disclose her private information. Second, production decisions might be distorted by the entrepreneur’s disclosure incentives. The full disclosure equilibrium is associated with underinvestment, while overinvestment exists in the partial disclosure equilibrium. |
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Keywords: | G14 M41 M48 |
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