信息不对称下转基因食品生产企业、监管部门的博弈分析

由于信息不对称的存在，转基因食品生产企业和转基因食品监管部门之间存在博弈关系。转基因食品生产企业和转基因食品监管部门的策略选择决定了转基因食品市场的均衡。本文运用博弈论知识进行分析，认为无论是在静态博弈模型下，还是在动态博弈模型下，转基因食品生产企业重视转基因食品的宣传，自觉加贴食品中转基因成分标签的概率随着转基因食品监管部门监管概率的增大而增大。为了保护消费者的利益，转基因食品相关监管部门要加大对转基因食品企业的监管力度。

A game Analysis between GM food Production enterprises and Regulators in Information Asymmetry

Information asymmetry exists in a game relation between GM food Production enterprises and Regulators. Thus the market equilibrium depend on the strategy of GM food Production enterprises and Regulators. Based on the knowledge of game theory, this paper argues that the probability of GM food Production enterprises paying attention to the propaganda and labeling Genetically modified food Consciously increase along with the probability of Regulation whether in Dynamic Game or Static Game. For the sake of Consumers, the Regulation of GM food is Essential.