| 地方政府经济干预行为的经济学解释 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭强.地方政府经济干预行为的经济学解释[J].财经研究,2005,31(9):5-16. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭强 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,管理学院,上海,200030 |
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| 摘 要： | 以往分析地方政府干预经济行为的研究较多关注于地方政府的意识形态偏好.文章通过构建以中央政府行为为外生变量的地方政府行为模型,对在中央政策给定的情况下,地方政府的种种政策选择做出分析.对地方政府以优惠政策招商引资、对垄断部门实施保护以及民营企业对地方官员的"公关"、民企参与国企改组迟缓等现象做出了解释.借助地方政府和中央政府的动态博弈模型,分析了中央政策对地方政府行为的影响.
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府行为 市场准入 地方保护 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-9952（2005）09-0005-12 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-05-16 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-05-16 |
The Economic Explanation of Economic Intervention Behaviors of Regional Government |
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| GUO Qiang.The Economic Explanation of Economic Intervention Behaviors of Regional Government[J].The Study of Finance and Economics,2005,31(9):5-16. |
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| Authors: | GUO Qiang |
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| Abstract: | The studies about the economic intervention behaviors of regional government by now have paid more attention to their ideology preference, while this paper puts emphasis on the internal mechanism. It explains the behaviors of regional government based on the model in which the policy of the central government is predetermined. And it analyzes the influence of central government on the regional government by a dynamic game model. |
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| Keywords: | the behavior of regional government market access local protection |
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