财政分权下的晋升激励、部门利益与土地违法

本文考察了我国30个省、市、自治区在1999—2005年间的土地违法情况,并利用面板回归技术对其影响因素进行了经验分析。研究发现:与土地违法显著相关的因素主要包括在财政分权制度下地方政府官员的晋升激励和地方土地部门的部门利益。除此之外,我们还分别讨论了土地违法在东、中和西部地区的分布情况及其影响因素,以及不同时期的土地政策对土地违法的影响。结果表明,2002年颁布的土地出让政策和2003年开始的对土地违法的严厉打击均对土地违法有着相当重要的影响。

PROMOTION INCENTIVES,DEPARTMENTAL INTERESTS AND LAND LAWBREAKING UNDER FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

This paper employs panel data techniques to study the main influencing factors of land law violations in 30 regions in China from 1999 to 2005. The main factors singled out include the promotion incentives of local officials and the departmental interests of local land administration agencies under fiscal decentralization. The paper also analyzes the regional distribution of land law violations as well as the effects of central government policies. Instead of putting the blame on local governments for land ...