Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government |
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Authors: | R Emre Aytimur |
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Institution: | 1. Chair of Public Economics, Georg-August University G?ttingen, Platz der G?ttinger Sieben 3, 37073?, G?ttingen, Germany
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Abstract: | Lobbying a coalition government is different from lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. In the case where the interest group prefers the status quo to the surplus maximizing policy, the interest group influences the policy without any contribution due to its credible threat to block unfavorable proposals. Furthermore, we show that when, say, a leftist coalition government may be replaced by a rightist coalition government, the final policy reflects a rightist interest group’s preferences more heavily due to the interest group’s forward-looking considerations. |
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