Purchasing for someone else in a b-to-b context: Joint effects of choice overload and accountability

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the (negative) influence of assortment size identified in the business-to-consumer (B-to-C) literature also exists in business-to-business (B-to-B) settings and whether it is contingent on buyers’ accountability for their choices. Furthermore, it is examined if and to what extent assortment presentation in the form of color-coding may reduce the negative effects on decision satisfaction caused by large assortments.

Methodology/approach: In addition to a qualitative study (i.e., Study 1) including 16 semi-structured expert interviews, we conducted two experiments with real industrial buyers to further examine the interaction effect of assortment size and accountability on decision satisfaction as well as the moderating effect of color-coding. Specifically, in Study 2, we used a 2 (assortment size: small versus large) X 2 (accountability: informal versus official) between-subjects design. A 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed an interactive effect of assortment size and accountability on decision satisfaction. Furthermore, we ran a moderated mediation analysis to test for the underlying process. Study 3 used a 2 (color-coding: yes versus no) X 2 (accountability: informal versus official) between-subjects design. A comparison of the means across the experimental cells provided support for a positive influence of color-coding when industrial buyers are informally (rather than officially) accountable.

Findings: Our experiments show that when B-to-B buyers are held officially accountable, they experience equal decision satisfaction when choosing from small and large assortments. However, when buyers are held informally accountable, they experience a higher decision satisfaction when choosing from small rather than large assortments. These effects are mediated by decision justifiability. Furthermore, we show that color-coding the assortment influences buyers’ decision satisfaction positively when they are held informally accountable and are asked to choose from a large assortment.

Research implications: Our research contributes by demonstrating that overchoice effects exist in B-to-B settings. In addition, our studies show that potential overchoice effects are contingent on the specific form of accountability that industrial buyers experience. In this respect, our findings make an important contribution to the literature on B-to-B decision making and the role of accountability in these decisions.

Practical implications: Our research also has practical implications for managers that have to make assortment decisions as an appealing and easy to understand assortment is an important means to compete in the market. Many companies offer large assortments that, at the same time, are efficient in fulfilling customer needs and therefore do not have the potential to be reduced through the elimination of certain product variants. Assortment presentation (for example through color-coding) can be the key to offering a high number of variants while making the assortment mentally convenient at the same time.

Originality/value/contribution: To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first research to provide a more fine-grained analysis of official and informal accountability in a B-to-B context and to examine the differences between these two forms of accountability in an experimental setting with real industrial buyers.