Petty corruption |
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Authors: | Seung Han Yoo |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur’s type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over 0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat,
no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium.
I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar for valuable guidance and encouragement. I am also grateful to Kaushik Basu, Fernando
Vega-Redondo, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the international meeting for public economic theory (PET07) and
especially Ani Guerdjikova and Roy Radner for helpful comments. Thanks are due to Hideaki Goto and Eunkyeong Lee for useful
conversation. |
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Keywords: | Corruption Economic development Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Repeated games |
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