Implementing just and efficient decision-making |
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Authors: | Hervé Moulin |
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Affiliation: | CEREMADE, Université Paris IX, and École Polytechnique, 75230 Paris Cedex 05, France |
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Abstract: | In an economy with one public good, one private good and quasi-linear utilities we explore decision-making mechanisms to non-cooperatively implement an efficient outcome. By auctioning the leadership role among agents, one implements egalitarianism, namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo. A refinement of this mechanism (so-called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds) allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome: it achieves egalitarianism above the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves decision. |
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