Managerial Self-Interest, Pension Financial Slack and Corporate Pension Funding |
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Authors: | Sudip Datta Mai E. Iskandar-Datta Edward J. Zychowicz |
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Affiliation: | Bentley College, Waltham, MA 02154;University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth, MA 02747;Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY 11550 |
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Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of managerial self-interest on corporate pension funding decisions. It is postulated that managers with no ownership stake in the firm will have incentives to maintain financial slack in the form of excess pension funding. Pension funding slack may be viewed as a managerial perquisite that decreases the probability of necessary future debt financing. Such a strategy may increase the value of undiversified human capital to the detriment of maximizing shareholder wealth. As managerial ownership increases, the incentives to consume such a perquisite will decrease since the interests of managers and shareholders become more aligned. The results presented in this study strongly support this proposition. |
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