投资持股关系中的“共享审计师”效应研究

以2007—2015年我国资本市场上具有投资持股关系的上市公司为样本,通过研究持股方和被持股方聘请同一家会计师事务所对持股双方各自审计收费和审计质量的影响,探讨投资持股关系的"共享审计师"中,"信息共享"效应与"低价揽客"效应谁更明显。研究表明,当具有持股关系的两家公司共同聘请同一家会计师事务所后,"信息共享"效应更明显,表现为持股双方的财务报表审计质量和持股方的审计收费显著提升。进一步研究发现:持股双方在不同情况下会选择性价比最高,最有利于自身的方式来获取信息,以谋求"信息共享"效应最大化。

The Study on the Effect of Shared Auditor in Investment and Stockholding Relationship

We take public companies owning investment links and undertaking the same accounting firm, which is called "shared auditor" from 2007 to 2015 as example to explore the information sharing effect and low-balling effect in the special phenomenon "shared auditor" in the stock-holding relationship by comparing the audit quality and audit fees in both the investors and investees. We finally find that the information sharing effect is more significant when the two in the investment link share the same accounting firm. We find when two companies share audit, their audit quality and audit fees of investors will grow up obviously. In additional research, we find both the investors and investees will find the most cost-effective and beneficial way to get information and maximize the "information sharing "effect.