The good,the bad,and the ugly: Technology transfer competence,rent-seeking,and bargaining power

In this paper, we explore the relationships between subsidiary technology transfer competence, bargaining power and rent-seeking. In the multinational corporation, technology transfer competence is generally perceived as something desirable. We connect this bright side of subsidiary-level processes to a potentially uglier and darker side of the organization, namely that subsidiaries gain bargaining power that is exercised for bad ends, i.e., rent-seeking. Using an empirical analysis that comprises intrafirm technology transfers, this paper finds that technology transfer competence leads to greater subsidiary bargaining power that in turn increases rent-seeking behavior; but this competence does not directly affect rent-seeking. We suggest that bargaining power offers a key explanation for rent-seeking. This paper advances the understanding of subsidiary sources of power within the multinational corporation and the organizational determinants of rent-seeking, which is relevant to theory development as well as to managers.