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| 专利开发商FDI国别选择的博弈分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 尹霞,屠梅曾. 专利开发商FDI国别选择的博弈分析[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2005, 22(11): 75-76 |
| 作者姓名： | 尹霞 屠梅曾 |
| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200240 |
| 摘 要： | 在一个把专利开发商和盗版商看作博弈双方的完全信息静态博弈模型中,考察了在某些盗版猖獗的国家仍然有大量外国专利开发商进行投资的现象;发现外商投资很大程度上取决于产品所在国的市场容量、税率以及对知识产权的保护力度等因素. |
| 关 键 词： | 专利开发商 盗版 完全信息静态博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-7348（2005）11-0075-02 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-03-31 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-03-31 |
Game Theory in Analysis of Patent Exploiter''''s Choosing FDI Country |
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| Yin Xia;Tu MeiCeng. Game Theory in Analysis of Patent Exploiter''''s Choosing FDI Country[J]. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2005, 22(11): 75-76 | |
| Authors: | Yin Xia Tu MeiCeng |
| Abstract: | Patent exploiter and pirate were taken as two players in a complete information static game model.Although the exitence of pirate is very rampant, many foreign investors invest in continually.As a result,it attracts attention in the world trade business.A two-person static game model was set to solve this strange phenomenon and to get a conclusion. |
| Keywords: | patent exploiter pirate complete information static game model |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |