农村社区公共物品的农户自愿供给——基于声誉理论的分析

农户的声誉不仅能给农户带来直接效用,它还具备信息效应与资本效应,对农户参与农村社区公共物品供给博弈的均衡路径产生重要影响。在独立博弈下,声誉的直接效用能使农户采取合作行动;在关联博弈和重复博弈中,声誉的信息及资本效应对农户的偷懒行为有很强的约束,将导致博弈进入合作均衡。因此基于声誉损益的考虑,由农户自愿供给农村社区内的公共物品会是一个有效的结果。

Farmers'''' Voluntary Provision of Public Goods in Rural Communities——Analysis Based on the Theory of Reputation

Farmers' reputation may produce not only direct utility,but also information effect and capital effect,and this will significantly affect the equilibrium path for farmers to take part in the game of providing public goods in rural community.The direct utility from reputation can make the farmers cooperate in the sole game.At the same time,the reputation information and capital effect have strong restriction to farmers' non-cooperation in the associated and repeated games,and this helps to obtain a cooperation equilibrium.So taking reputation into account,farmers voluntarily provision of public goods in rural communities will be an effective result.