Autocratic governors in public procurement |
| |
| Institution: | 1. National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia;2. Bocconi University, Italy;1. Etla Economic Research, Finland;2. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, Finland;3. University of Helsinki, Finland;1. Louisiana State University and NBER, USA;2. Hasselt University, Belgium;1. CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Politickych veznu 7, 111 21 Prague, Czech Republic;2. IAE-CSIC and Barcelona GSE, Campus UAB, Bellaterra, Barcelona, 08193, Spain;1. Department of Environmental Economics and Management, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel;2. Department of Environmental Economics and Management and the Center for Agricultural Economic Research, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel;1. De Nederlandsche Bank, the Netherlands;2. Groningen University, the Netherlands;1. University of Bologna, Department of Economics, Italy;2. CESifo, Germany;3. IZA, Germany;4. CHILD-CCA, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | The personal role of sub-national rulers is crucial for regional development in countries with weak institutions. This paper studies the impact of regional governors’ tenure in office and their local ties on procurement performance in Russia. To identify the causal effect, we construct instruments for governor’s tenure by exploiting the regional vote share of ruling party in past parliament elections. We find the evidence that governors who do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared to governors with local ties (insiders). Namely, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at awarding stage significantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, for governors-outsiders this restriction becomes stronger with tenure in office, while governors-insiders do not demonstrate such negative tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition by governors-outsiders cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution: the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination either increase or keep stable with tenure for governors-outsiders and these outcomes decrease with tenure for governors-insiders. |
| |
| Keywords: | Public procurement Tenure in office Governor Competition Efficiency Contract execution H57 H83 D44 |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
