反倾销政策与研发竞争

借助异质产品的Bertrand双寡头模型,本文分析了一国反倾销政策对该国企业和外国企业的研发、产品价格及社会福利的影响。研究结论表明:与自由贸易相比,当产品的差异度较小时,受反倾销政策保护的企业会策略性地利用反倾销政策而退出国外市场,减少研发投入,进而提高产品价格,而遭受反倾销政策约束的外国企业由于其研发投入的边际收入增加,因而会增加研发投入,降低产品价格。此外,反倾销政策的存在还有可能促进各国社会福利的提升。

Antidumping Polices and R&D Competition

The paper analyses the impact of antidumping policies on home firm and foreign firm′s R&D,price and social welfare in a Bertrand duopoly model on differentitated goods.It is shown that,in contrast with free trade,an antidumping policy can be strategically exploited by the home firm to exit foreign market.It reduces the input on R&D and then increases price when the differentiated degree of goods is smaller.While due to the rise of marginal revenue of input on R&D,the foreign firm increases the input on R&D and then reduces price.Moreover,antidumping polices maybe promote each country′s social welfare.