信息、委托代理、声誉与我国上市公司资金闲置

文章基于信息经济学理论构建委托代理模型,研究我国上市公司资金闲置问题,并引入声誉因素对模型进行动态博弈分析。研究结果表明:短期激励机制条件下,投资不足、过度投资与资金闲置现象可以在公司内并存;声誉与对经理人激励的长期有效性,是解决投资不足、过度投资与资金闲置并存问题的关键;法律机制的完善与信息的公开,也有助于资金闲置问题的解决。

Information, Principal-Agent, Reputation and Leave Unused Capital of China's Listed Enterprises

Based on the model of principal-agent of information economics,this paper studied the phenomenon of leave unused capital of china's listed enterprises.After adding the reputation-factor,the paper analyzed the model by dynamic game theory.We show:(1) under the situation of the short-time incentive mechanism,the short-investment,over-investment and leave unused capital can exist simultaneously in one company;(2) reputation can have the validity in a long-time incentive mechanism to managers,which is the key of settling the problem of the simultaneous existing of the short-investment,over-investment and leave unused capital in one company;(3) perfecting the law mechanism and the information opening mechanism can also be helpful for the settlement of problem of leave unused capital.