Delegation Commitment in Oligopoly |
| |
| Authors: | Ya-Chin Wang Leonard F. S. Wang |
| |
| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Finance and Banking, Kun Shan University, Tainan Hsien, 71003, Taiwan, Republic of China;(2) Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung, No.700, Kaohsiung University Road, Nan-Tzu District 811, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Republic of China |
| |
| Abstract: | ![]()
Dealing with managerial incentive in an oligopolistic competition market where the relevant strategic variables are not directly quantities but incentive schemes. It is found that, in the sequential delegation model, the leader output will not be affected by changing the number of the follower firms when there is only one leader. In addition, more equal distribution of the number of leaders and followers will result in higher industry output, lower price, lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and higher economic welfare; moreover, economic welfare in the sequential delegation model is always higher than in a simultaneous delegation model. |
| |
| Keywords: | managerial delegation multiple leader order of moves |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
