论我国商业银行的公司治理

我国商业银行正处在股权结构安排的两难境地，由此导致商业银行的公司治理被行政治理所淹没。这种股权结构两难源自政府在改革中所形成的两种不同的效用函数，其中为了存续并巩固政权的非正规约束决定了商业银行的国有股控股取代股权分散与公司法人治理的股权结构，但改革者最终基于成本—收益的比较分析，有可能摆脱传统意识形态的约束走出股权结构两难，使商业银行“国有股—股独大”与股权分置的局面得以改观，从而真正走上公司治理的道路。

The Companies' Administration of China's Commercial Bank

China's commercial bank is facing a difficult choice of shareholding structure. Which leads to the disappearance of the company management of the commercial bank. The dilemma sprang from the two different utilities that were formed by the government. In addition, the informal restraint to sustain and consolidate political power decides the shareholding that commercial bank's state-owned shares replace the share-dot and corporation theory. But the author thinks that on the basis of the cost-profit analysis, the reformers , can get rid of the traditional restraint and end the stock-rights dilemma, which can make the commercial bank change the appearance of state-owned shares being the most important stock. Finally we can administrate the company well.