Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion |
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| Authors: | Richard D. Horan James S. Shortle David G. Abler |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Agricultural Economics, 87 Agriculture Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1039, USA;(2) Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Pennsylvania State University, Armsby Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA |
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| Abstract: | We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques. |
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| Keywords: | ambient taxes asymmetric information nonpoint pollution risk-aversion water quality |
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