| 关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量 |
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| 引用本文： | 佟岩,王化成. 关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量[J]. 会计研究, 2007, 46(4): 75-82 |
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| 作者姓名： | 佟岩 王化成 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京理工大学管理与经济学院,100081,中国人民大学商学院,100872 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372065:“上市公司盈余质量研究”和70572096:“中国上市公司控制权转移的利益流动”)的阶段性成果，中国人民大学“985”工程项目，高校青年教师奖励计划的资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 控股股东通常使用关联交易追求控制权收益(包括私有收益和共享收益)。在不同控制权收益驱使下,关联交易对盈余质量的影响也完全不同。本文使用2001、2002年中国上市公司的数据检验发现,当控股股东持股在50%及以下时,更多通过关联交易追求控制权私有收益,结果降低了盈余质量;而当控股股东持股超过50%时,偏好通过关联交易获取控制权共享收益,最终提高了盈余质量。
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| 关 键 词： | 关联交易 控制权收益 盈余质量 控股股东 |
Related Party Transactions, Benefits of Control and Earnings Quality |
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| Tong Yan,Wang Huacheng. Related Party Transactions, Benefits of Control and Earnings Quality[J]. Accounting Research, 2007, 46(4): 75-82 |
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| Authors: | Tong Yan Wang Huacheng |
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| Abstract: | Controlling shareholders pursue benefits of control private benefits and shared benefits——via related party transactions,which result in different levels of earnings quality.Using data of 2001 and 2002,we find that when the ratio of shareholdings is less than 50%,earnings quality is deteriorated during the process of related party transactions through which controlling shareholders prefer get private benefits of control.On the other hand,when the ratio is more than 50%,considering more shared benefits compared with private benefits,controlling shareholders still like related qarty transaction which improve earnings quality as a result. |
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