投资者利益保护与新兴市场证券发行管制

本文构建了一个模型,说明在一个非有效程度比较高的证券市场中,公司可以通过发行新股融资侵占外部公众投资者的利益。此时,证券发行的门坎管制和规模限制对保护投资者利益是必要和有效的;如果事后的投资者利益的法律保护等监管制度的有效性弱, 证券发行管制就更有必要,以此来限制经营能力较差的公司为NPV<0的项目融资。对融资和投资分离的研究还表明,限制上市公司融资规模可以减少管理层基于自我利益的过度融资和低效投资。随着投资者保护的法律制度完善和执行有效,信息披露规范,加上机构投资者力量壮大,市场评价能力增强,可以放松证券发行事前的门坎限制和融资规模限制,逐步实现证券发行市场化。

The Protection of Investors and the Regulation on Security Issue

In this paper, we present a model in an inefficient stock market, and find that the company can seize the benefit of new public investors through Seasoned Equity Offerings. We prove that the regulation on security issue can prevent a bad company financing for negative NPV projects, therefore can protect public investors from seizing. Moreover, the regulation is also necessary when the inefficiency of the market is serious. We also find the scale limitation on financing can reduce the low efficiency investment, thus is helpful to protect public investors.