Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information* |
| |
Authors: | Camille Cornand Frank Heinemann |
| |
Institution: | 1. National Centre for Scientific Research and BETA, F‐67085 Strasbourg, France cornand@cournot.u‐strasbg.fr;2. Technical University Berlin, DE‐10623 Berlin, Germany f.heinemann@ww.tu‐berlin.de |
| |
Abstract: | We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by different players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post. This process defines players' expected private values of a successful attack. The main result shows that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed and (ii) private beliefs about signals' relative precision differ sufficiently. We derive some implications for information dissemination policy. Transparency in this context is multidimensional: it concerns the publicity of announcements, the number of signals disclosed and their precision. |
| |
Keywords: | Speculative attack coordination game multiple equilibria public and private information transparency F31 D82 |
|