利益集团、行为偏好与黄宗羲定律——中国封建王朝更替动因的经济学分析

中国封建社会特殊的社会结构下,封建王朝在其演进过程中,农民集团和官僚集团之间的利益博弈对税赋改革的影响会导致＂黄宗羲定律＂的形成。税赋愈改愈重使得农民在当朝所能获得的效用随时间的推移而降低,从而导致农民预期起义成本的降低,当这种预期成本下降到一定水平后,农民集团会采取有效的集团行动并转向对新的政治体制的寻求,最终完成朝代的更替。这一过程可以运用经济学的基本理论,并建立适当模型,从而对中国社会特有的王朝更替现象进行解释。

Interest Group, Behavior Preference and the Huang Zongxi's Law:An Economic Analysis about the Cause of China's Feudal Dynasties Replacement

Because of the special social structure of China’s feudal society,benefits gambling between the farmer group and bureaucrat had an influence on the taxation reform,which resulted in the formation of "Huang Zongxi’s law" in the evolution process of the feudal dynasties.As time goes on,the burden of tax becomes heavier and peasants’ utility under the dynasty at that time become lower,that is to say,the farmers’ expected revolt cost is reduced.When this expected cost down to a certain level,farmers group will take effective actions to seek for a new political system which can replace the old dynasty.As to this process,we can use the basic economies theory to establish appropriate models to give a reasonable explanation for the Chinese social peculiar dynasty replaced phenomenon.