造假——打假的经济博弈分析 |
| |
引用本文: | 邱冬阳,孟卫东. 造假——打假的经济博弈分析[J]. 商业研究, 2003, 0(17): 10-12 |
| |
作者姓名: | 邱冬阳 孟卫东 |
| |
作者单位: | 重庆大学,工商管理学院,重庆,400044 |
| |
摘 要: | 从经济学角度分析了造假—打假之间的博弈模型及其隐含的经济原理,提出了造假中的“囚徒困境” 和大小公司造假动机的博弈模型,并就此展开论述了打假的对策措施,以有助于有关部门治假。
|
关 键 词: | 信息不对称 博弈 造假 打假 |
文章编号: | 1001-148x(2003)17-0010-03 |
修稿时间: | 2002-09-10 |
Economics and Game Analysis on Counterfeit and Anti-Counterfeit |
| |
Abstract: | From the economics angle, the paper analyzes the game relationship between counterfeit and anti-counterfeit, which results in the implied economic principle. It points out "prisoners' dilemma", and the motive game models of large and small companies in counterfeit. The author provides anti-counterfeit measures for the sectors concerned to clean up this sort of immoral behavior. |
| |
Keywords: | asymmetric information game theory counterfeit anti-counterfeit |
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录! |
|