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造假——打假的经济博弈分析
引用本文:邱冬阳,孟卫东. 造假——打假的经济博弈分析[J]. 商业研究, 2003, 0(17): 10-12
作者姓名:邱冬阳  孟卫东
作者单位:重庆大学,工商管理学院,重庆,400044
摘    要:从经济学角度分析了造假—打假之间的博弈模型及其隐含的经济原理,提出了造假中的“囚徒困境” 和大小公司造假动机的博弈模型,并就此展开论述了打假的对策措施,以有助于有关部门治假。

关 键 词:信息不对称  博弈  造假  打假
文章编号:1001-148x(2003)17-0010-03
修稿时间:2002-09-10

Economics and Game Analysis on Counterfeit and Anti-Counterfeit
Abstract:From the economics angle, the paper analyzes the game relationship between counterfeit and anti-counterfeit, which results in the implied economic principle. It points out "prisoners' dilemma", and the motive game models of large and small companies in counterfeit. The author provides anti-counterfeit measures for the sectors concerned to clean up this sort of immoral behavior.
Keywords:asymmetric information   game theory   counterfeit anti-counterfeit
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