企业、银行和政府三方还贷博弈研究

预算软约束已成为国有企业改革的阻碍因素,并影响经济转型期的政企、银企关系,而政府对于债务的软预算约束是企业信贷违约的原因之一,根据企业还贷过程中相关利益者的相互博弈,建立一个企业、银行、政府之间三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的行为及其目标差异对企业信贷违约的影响。模型分析表明：政府出于政治和经济利益的考虑,通过补贴银行和企业来实施对企业还贷的软预算约束,而银行在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后有可能对企业再贷款。解决预算软约束和企业信贷违约的关键在于＂政府、银行、企业＂之间的关系处理,企业完全按市场化运作,建立科学的法人治理结构,让政府从企业中逐步退出,硬化企业的预算约束环境,从而降低企业的信贷违约的概率。

Loan Game of Enterprises, Banks and Government on the Soft Budget Constraint

Soft budget constraint has become a barrier to state-owned enterprise reform and affects relationship of government and enterprises,bank-enterprise in economic transition.One of the reasons about soft budget constraint and loan default is that government intervenes enterprises’ debt on soft budget constraint.The behavior difference among enterprises,banks and government and how it affects loan default on building game model for three players are studied.The game model suggests that the government for political and economic interests implements the soft budget constraint enterprises by subsidizing banks and loan companies,and banks may be re-lending to enterprises in assessing the gains and losses after the government subsidies and liquidation.The key of solving the soft budget constraint and corporate credit default is to deal with the relationship of the government,banks and enterprises’.Operation of enterprises is by the market entirely and establishing a scientific corporate governance structure.The government gradually withdraws from the business and hardens enterprise budget constraints environment and and thus reduce the probability of credit default.