第三方物流的监督博弈研究

由于物流外包中物流需求方与物流服务商之间的签约后的信息不对称,带来了第三方物流中的道德风险。物流需求方通过对第三方物流服务商的监督激励能够有效地减少服务商的机会主义行为,提高服务商的服务水平,克服第三方物流应用中的负面效应。本文基于物流外包中第三方物流的违规动机和外包的风险,运用非合作博弈论的理论和方法,构建了第三方物流的监督博弈模型,并应用混合纳什均衡模型对第三方物流的监督问题进行了定量分析,详细分析了物流需求方和服务商的决策行为,求出了混合战略纳什均衡点,得出了制约博弈双方决策行为的关键因素,并提出了对第三方物流企业进行有效监督的若干建议,为物流需求方提供了有效监督决策的理论依据和实践参考。

A Study on Supervising Game of Third-Party Logistics

Due to the information asymmetry between logistics supplier and demander before and after signing logistics service outsourcing contract in the process of the logistics outsourcing,which brings the third party logistics moral hazard.Logistics demander could effectively control the opportunistic behavior of service providers,improve the performance of logistics service and overcome the negative effects of third party logistics application by the supervision and incentive on the third party logistics services.Based on the illegal motivation of the third party logistics and the risk of outsourcing in the process of the logistics outsourcing,this paper builds the game theory model to monitor its execution of third party logistics game with non-cooperative game theory and methods.It has a quantitative analysis to the supervision of the third party logistics with Mix Nash equilibrium model.It also analyzes the decision-making behavior of the demand and logistics service providers in logistics supplier and demander and finds the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.The article even gets the key factors which constraints decision-making behavior of the two sides of the game after the model is solved.It then proposes to the third party logistics enterprise effective supervision suggestions on it.Finally,on the basis of which,many theoretical basis and practical references are given on how to supervise decision-makings effectively for the demand-side logistics.