进入管制与产品质量

本文分析了政府进入管制对厂商最优质量水平及市场平均质量水平的影响。在模型中 ,消费者对产品质量的主观推断存在误差 ,而产品需求在短期内保持稳定。财政收入最大化政府设置行政性进入壁垒并对非法进入者进行惩罚。因而 ,非法进入者虽然可以以冒牌的方式进入行业或市场 ,但有面临被处罚的可能性。分析结果表明 ,政府一定有动力实施管制 ,且将查处的力度确定如此水平 ,使得冒牌厂商“打而不死” ;此时 ,市场平均质量水平则低于或等于无管制情形。本文的分析还表明 ,在位厂商和非法进入者的均衡质量水平均与管制力度呈负相关关系。

Entry Regulation and Product Quality

This paper analyzes the influences caused by administrative entry regulation on firms' optimal product qualities and the average product quality of the market. In the model, consumers, whose number is assumed to be constant, have difficulties in telling the quality of a certain product precisely. The fiscal revenue maximizing government sets administrative entry regulation and fines all the illegal enterers. Thus, despite of the fact that potential illegal enterers can enter the market through counterfeiting the product of the incumbent, they have to face the probability of being fined. The analysis shows that, the government does have incentive to undertake the regulation but will adjust the regulation to such an extent that entry is still profitable for potential illegal enterers. The product quality under regulation is either less than or equal to that in the situation of no regulation. This paper also shows that both the product quality of the incumbent and that of the illegal enterer in equilibrium are negatively correlated with the strength of the regulation.