督促司乘双方双重履约的博弈模型和奖惩机制

为了减少网约车平台在将订单派发给司机后司机与乘客违约的情况,有必要对司乘双方的行为进行一定约束.首先基于演化博弈理论构建网约车平台、司机和乘客的三方演化博弈模型,然后分析网约车平台、司机和乘客的演化路径及稳定策略,以及三方共同作用的演化策略的稳定性,最后通过算例仿真分析进行验证.结果显示,只有当网约车平台对司乘双方实施高强度的奖惩力度才能起到督促司乘双方选择履约策略的作用.

Game Model and Reward and Punishment Mechanism for Supervising the Double Performance of Both Sides

In order to reduce the situation that drivers or passengers breach the contract after the online car- hailing platform distributes the order to the drivers. It is necessary to restrict the behavior of drivers and passengers. Firstly, based on the evolutionary game theory, a three-party evolutionary game model of online car- hailing platform, driver and passenger is constructed. Then, the evolutionary path and stability strategy of online car-hailing platform, driver and passenger are analyzed, as well as the stability of the three-party evolutionary strategy. Finally, the simulation analysis of a numerical example is used to verify the model. It is concluded that only when the online car-hailing platform implements high-intensity rewards and punishments on both sides can it play a role in urging both sides to choose the performance strategy.