碳交易背景下考虑公平关切的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策

考虑到碳交易政策和公平偏好会影响双渠道闭环供应链定价决策，分别构建碳交易背景下公平中性、零售商公平关切信息对称与不对称时双渠道闭环供应链进行最优决策的Stackelberg动态博弈模型。通过求解各个均衡解，研究各个均衡解与制造商和零售商公平关切的关系。通过数值算例分析，着重考虑零售商公平关切信息对称与不对称时制造商和零售商公平关切对双闭环供应链最优定价决策的影响，并进行对比分析。研究结果表明：无论零售商公平关切信息对称还是不对称，新产品的销售价格与制造商和零售商公平关切都成正比，再制品的销售价格不受公平关切的影响；新产品的市场需求与制造商和零售商公平关切都成反比，再制品的市场需求与制造商和零售商的公平关切都成正比；公平关切会降低企业利润，公平关切信息不对称会加剧这一现象。

Dual Channel Closed-loop Supply Chain Pricing Decision Considering Equity Concerns in the Context of Carbon Trading

Considering that carbon trading policies and fairness preferences can affect pricing decisions of dual-channel closed-loop supply chains, Stackelberg dynamic game models are constructed for optimal decision-making of dual-channel closed-loop supply chains under the background of carbon trading, when retailers are fair and concerned about information symmetry and asymmetric. By solving each equilibrium solution, the relationship between each equilibrium solution and the equity concerns of manufacturers and retailers is studied. Through numerical example analysis,the influence of retailers'' fairness concerns on the optimal pricing decision of dual-channel closed-loop supply chain is analyzed, especially when retailers'' fairness concerns are symmetrical and asymmetric. The results show that the selling price of new products is proportional to the fair concern of both manufacturers and retailers, and the selling price of remanufactured products is not affected by the fair concern. The market demand for new products is inversely proportional to the fair concerns of manufacturers and retailers,and the market demand for remanufactured products is proportional to the fair concerns of manufacturers and retailers. Equity concerns will reduce corporate profits, and equity concerns information asymmetry will exacerbate this phenomenon.