A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments

Many conflicts and negotiations can be viewed as dynamic gamesin which parties have no commitment power. In our model, a potentialaggressor demands concessions from a weaker party by threateningwar. The absence of commitment makes a continuous stream oftransfers a more effective appeasement strategy than a lump-sumtransfer. As long as both sides have constant marginal utilityof consumption, it is possible to construct a self-enforcingpeace agreement even if transfers shift the balance of power.When marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, a self-enforcingpeace agreement may not be feasible. The bargaining power ofthe potential aggressor increases dramatically if she is ableto make probabilistic threats, for example, by taking an observableaction that leads to war with a positive probability. This "brinkmanshipstrategy" allows a blackmailer to extract a positive streamof payments from the victim, even if carrying out the threatis harmful to both parties. Our results are applicable to environmentsranging from diplomacy to negotiations within or among firmsand are aimed to bring together "parallel" investigations inthe nature of commitment in economics and political science.